



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5750
S-3
3 Jul 1985

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HDH-4), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC 20380
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (S-3)
(2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY, PERIOD 1 JANUARY 1985 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1985

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1F
(b) WgO 5750.1E
(c) GruO 5750.1

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology is submitted.

SECTION I

Unit Designation

- a. Reporting Unit Code: 01251
- b. Table of Organization Number: 8849N

Period Covered and Location

1 January 1985-30 June 1985 at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

Personnel Information

- a. Commanding Officer LTCOL Dennis L. DOYLE
1 January 1985 - 30 June 1985
- b. Executive Officer MAJ Benard F. RAMEY
1 January 1985 - 13 June 1985
MAJ Ronald C. SMITH
14 June 1985 - 30 June 1985
- c. Administrative Officer CAPT James R. KENNEY
1 January 1985 - 30 June 1985
- d. Intelligence Officer CAPT Randolph E. TOM
1 January 1985 - 30 June 1985

VMFA-251

Jan-Jun 1985

5750
3 Jul 1985

e. Operations Officer MAJ Thomas V. WOLF
1 January 1985 - 23 June 1985
CAPT William F. PRATT
24 June 1985 - 30 June 1985

f. Logistics Officer CAPT John D. FROMULARO
1 January 1985 - 30 June 1985

g. Aircraft Maintenance Officer MAJ Frank M. SCOTT
1 January 1985 - 27 May 1985
MAJ John B. HULICK
28 May 1985 - 30 June 1985

h. Safety Manager MAJ Ronald C. SMITH
1 January 1985 - 13 June 1985
CAPT Mark S. BARNHART
14 June 1985 - 30 June 1985

i. Staff Historian CAPT Howard F. BARKER
1 January 1985 - 15 April 1985
CAPT John M. GODWIN
16 April 1985 - 30 June 1985

j. Sergeant Major SGTMAJ David E. RIPLEY
1 January 1985 - 30 June 1985

Average Monthly Strength:

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Officer/Enlisted</u>		<u>Officer/Enlisted</u>	
January 1985	39	230	0	0
February 1985	39	227	0	0
March 1985	39	225	0	0
April 1985	37	224	0	0
May 1985	37	214	0	0
June 1985	37	207	0	0

Equipment:

	<u>No/Type</u>
January 1985	14/F-4S
February 1985	14/F-4S
March 1985	14/F-4S
April 1985	14/F-4S
May 1985	13/F-4S
June 1985	13/F-4S

SECTION 2

Command, Operations, and Training

January began with an OPTEVAL for all aircrew to provide a back-in-the-saddle following the holiday period. The squadron picked up the SOPWITH Camel duty to also start the new year. The primary crews for the upcoming Missile Shoot were brought up to speed and the squadron as a whole concentrated on Low Level Intercepts and Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) in preparation for the upcoming Red Flag Deployment. On 8 and 9 January the crews of 6 aircraft launched to Puerto Rico to participate in a shoot on arrival Missile Shoot, which resulted in a highly successful Missile Shoot for both aircrew and maintenance personnel. On 18 and 19 January the crews flew to Nellis AFB for the Red Flag Operation. At Red Flag strike escort constituted the bulk of the key sorties. The deployment ended on 31 January.

February found the squadron aircraft and personnel returning to Beaufort from the Red Flag Operation at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The squadron's training emphasis continued towards Fighter Intercepts and ACM in preparation for the upcoming DDS Deployment. The officers attended a Symposium on the 12th given by speakers from 2d MAW. The squadron participated in Seabat from the 12th through the 14th, an Air Force Exercise involving Dissimilar Air Combat Training. The end of the month found the squadron participating in a local Anti-Air Warfare Exercise with Combat Air Patrol and Fighter Intercepts as the primary missions.

March opened with 6 aircraft and 8 crews deploying to MCAS Cherry Point, NC for DDS. This successful deployment concluded on 9 March. All hands were given a Ground Safety Lecture on 8 March. The emphasis during the month, aside from DDS, was preparation for the Wing Internal Inspection (A&M) scheduled for the 18th. The A&M concluded on the 28th with the squadron receiving excellent ratings in several areas and generally high marks overall. Flying sorties were limited and concentrated on All Weather Intercepts. A squadron PFT was run for the A&M on 21 March with a make-up for the rest of the Squadron being held on 28 March. The month ended with a safety stand-down as 2 crews began their ACT(I) workup.

April brought a new month and a renewed interest in flying after the A&M. All Weather Intercepts, Fighter Intercepts and Air Combat Maneuvering were emphasized. The ACT(I) crews continued their workup and were successfully evaluated in the latter portion of the month. South East Brave, an Air Force exercise was conducted the 22-24 with Combat Air Patrol and Fighter Intercept being the basic missions. A safety lecture for all personnel concluded the month.

In May the Squadron was heavily involved in exercise Solid Shield while simultaneously preparing for a mid month deployment to FFARP at Oceana NAS Virginia. Solid Shield, a Combined Forces Exercise found the aircrews once again involved in performing Combat Air Patrol, Fighter Intercept, and Dissimilar Air Combat Training. The Squadron ended its role in Solid Shield by participating in an Anti-War Exercise and then deploying to FFARP in Oceana, Virginia.

June began with the Squadron concluding its deployment at FFARP where Fighter Intercepts and Dissimilar Air Combat Training were the order of the day. The Squadron returned to Beaufort on the 8th and immediately launched 2 aircraft and crews for a Missile Shoot on the 11th. The squadron picked up SOPWITH Camel duty on the 13th and participated in the MAG-31 Commanding Officer's Change of Command on the 14th. After a NORAD exercise on the 16th, the training emphasis turned to Air-to-Ground and low level in preparation for Yuma in August. A Squadron PFT on the 18th caught all the stragglers and safe driving lectures were conducted on the 21st and 28th, prior to long weekends given following the deployment.

Personnel and Administration

The Administrative Section excelled in the recent 2D MAW Internal Wing Inspection while maintaining it's high tempo of operations. The high rate of personnel turnover remains as the squadron prepares for the F/A-18 transition. The admin personnel continue to cross-train and better learn their particular MOS to better serve the squadron.

Legal Action

The Commanding Officer, VMFA-251 is the Special Courts Martial Convening Authority for the squadron. As such, the following legal proceedings were held in this squadron:

Special Courts Martial: 0
Summary Courts Martial: 1

Non-Judicial Punishment: 5

JAG Manual Investigations: 0

Medical

The assignment of a squadron Flight Surgeon has continued to be beneficial in improving pilot/physician working relationships. The Squadron's Flight Surgeon accompanied the unit on deployments ensuring consistent health treatment and continuity in the medical area.

Logistic/Supply

Logistic support for the squadron during the last 6 months has been good. Supplies have been adequate, not only at home base but at deployed sites.

Some shortages involved procurement of aircrew gear and office machines. Most of the gear and supplies ordered previously has arrived in the last few months.

Civic Action

Throughout the past 6 months numerous squadron tours were conducted. These tours were given to local school groups and to visiting educators from various Marine Corps Districts.

SECTION 3

January 1985	VMFA-251 flew 276 sorties/456.7 hours
3 January 1985	OPTEVAL for all aircrew
3-17 January 1985	SOPWITH CAMEL
4-8 January 1985	Crews workup for Missile Shoot
8-10 January 1985	Missile Shoot RR P.R.
18-20 January 1985	Crews transcon to Red Flag
21-31 January 1985	Red Flag deployment
February 1985	VMFA-251 flew 232 sorties/334.9 hours
1-3 February 1985	RTB from Red Flag
12 February 1985	Professional Officers Symposium
12-14 February 1985	Seabat
27-28 February 1985	AAWEX
March 1985	VMFA-251 flew 174 sorties/230.4 hours
1 March 1985	AAWEX
4-8 March 1985	TACTS/DDS deployment
8 March 1985	Ground Safety Lecture
21 March 1985	Squadron PFT
18-28 March 1985	A&M Inspection
27 March 1985	ACTI crews begin workup
28 March 1985	Safety Standdown, Squadron PFT
April 1985	VMFA-251 flew 277 sorties/342.3 hours
25-29 April 1985	ACT(I) evaluation
22-24 April 1985	SE Brave
25 April 1985	Safety Lecture

May 1985 VMFA-251 flew 255 sorties/320.3 hours
6-16 May 1985 Solid shield
13 May 1985 AAWEX
20-31 May 1985 FFARP deployment
June 1985 VMFA-251 flew 199 sorties/225.4 hours
1-7 June 1985 FFARP Deployment
8 June 1985 RTB from FFARP
11-12 June 1985 Missile Shoot, RR P.R.
14 June 1985 MAG-31 Change of Command
16 June 1985 NORAD Exercise
13-30 June 1985 SOPWITH CAMEL
18 June 1985 Squadron PFT
21 and 28 June 1985 Safe Driving Lectures

SECTION 4

Item 1.....Red Flag After Action Report
Item 2.....AAWEX After Action Report
Item 3.....DDS After Action Report
Item 4.....FFARP After Action Report


D. L. DOYLE



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

FILE

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120/3

S-3

25 Feb 1985

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; RED FLAG 85-2

Ref: (a) CO, VMFA-251 ltr (LOI) 3120 over S-3 of 20 Dec 1985

1. The following after action report is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

PART I - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS. I believe that Red Flag should be viewed as a "nice-to-have deployment" rather than a "must-have deployment" such as Yuma or FFARP. Red Flag provided our young aircrews with some valuable training not normally available at MCAS Beaufort. For example, operating from a field with an extremely complicated and congested traffic pattern reinforced many of the basics taught back in primary flight school. The tempo of operations at Nellis could be compared to operating from a base in a combat situation. The exposure to KC-135 tanking also made the entire operation worthwhile. Nine new pilots were exposed to this hazardous evolution. This squadron could now execute a Trans-oceanic movement with a minimum amount of work-ups. Finally the UHF communications jamming provided invaluable training. Aircrews quickly adapted to an environment with very limited UHF communications.

PART II - STATISTICAL DATA

1. The following data applies to the subject exercise:

a. Exercise Site: Nellis AFB, NV

b. Dates: 21 January 1985-1 February 1985

c. Number of Aircraft: 11 F-4S

d. Number of Personnel:

(1) Officers: 36

(2) Enlisted: 128

e. Training Objectives Achieved:

(1) Low altitude intercepts in a high threat, multi-bogey environment.

(2) Close fighter escort of strike packages.

(3) Exposure to KC-135 and KC-130 tanking.

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; RED FLAG 85-2

f. Flight Hours:

- (1) Total: 345.8
- (2) Deployment: 60.2
- (3) Retrograde: 54.8
- (4) Exercise: 226.1
- (5) Other: 4.7 (2.3 PMCF, 2.4 local Yuma flying)

g. Sorties:

- (1) Total: 209
- (2) Deployment: 36
- (3) Retrograde: 33
- (4) Exercise: 136
- (5) Other: 4 (2 PMCF, 2 local Yuma flying)

h. Ordnance Expended: None.

i. Targets/Ranges Utilized: R-4807, Red Flag Range Complex and Reveille MOA.

j. Ordnance Results: None.

PART III - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None.

2. Intelligence: None.

3. Operations:

a. Item: KC-130 Positioning

Discussion: The USMC KC-130 was forced to operate from NAS Fallon due to the limited amount of ramp space available at Nellis AFB. This denied this unit timely coordination on tanker availability which degraded the mission effectiveness on occasions when the tanker was down.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the USMC KC-130 be based at Nellis AFB so that easy coordination can be affected as to the tanker availability.

b. Item: KC-130 Utilization

Discussion: During this unit's week as Red Air the KC-130 was utilized solely on AR-625 which is outside of the Red Flag Range Complex. This

normally meant that F-4's arrived at their low altitude CAP close to being full on gas, but because of the large distances involved, to the tanker track, there existed no capability of returning to top-off and return to CAP before the war was over. Also the KC-130 was never involved in the tactical war because of his race track positioning.

Recommendation: It is recommended that KC-135 aircraft are used for the strategic tanker role to top-off Red Flag aircraft prior to their on range time and that the KC-130's are utilized in the range, close to the CAP's, to enable timely low altitude tactical tanking. This would ensure the KC-130's involvement in the tactical war and enable F-4's to stay on CAP for the duration of the war.

c. Item: Retrograde Operations

Discussion: The morning prior to VMFA-251's fly out day it became apparent that there would be weather problems enroute. Consultation between this unit and the Red Flag Staff made it obvious that VMFA-251 had to leave by 1300 on the scheduled fly out day regardless of the weather to provide sufficient space on the Red Flag ramp for incoming aircraft. Fortunately the weather did not develop as forecast and this unit was able to commence it's retrograde prior to 1300 on the scheduled fly out day. If the weather had developed as forecast the alternatives would have been to fly through and into the weather or transit to an interim airbase until the enroute weather cleared. Either choice would have unacceptable; flying into adverse weather for obvious reasons and transitting to an interim airbaes because of logistic problems (i.e. billeting, ramp space, maintenance support, supply support, etc.). Although Red Flag had limited ramp space, it appeared that sufficient ramp space was available on the airbase to accomodate this unit's aircraft for the short period required to allow the weather to clear. Despite this the Red Flag Staff was adamant that VMFA-251 make it's departure schedule.

Recommendation: With all of the ramp space available at Nellis AFB, supplementary to Red Flag, perhaps a more flexible approach to fly-out criteria could be adopted by the Red Flag Staff and Nellis Airfield Operations. This would ensure that units were not forced to launch into weather that is far from ideal.

4. Supply/Embarkation: None.

5. Maintenance:

a. Item: Tire/Wheel Build-Up

Discussion: MAG-31 Supply sent 2 pallets of nose/main wheel tires to Nellis while H&MS-31 failed to supply a tire/wheel build-up man. The pallets of tires were excess unusable weight.

Recommendation: MAG-31 not send F-4 nose/main wheel tires unless a tire and wheel build-up man is available.

b. Item: Chase Maintenance C-130

Discussion: The chase maintenance C-130 was a cargo frame for the trip out to Nellis. However, for the return trip the C-130 was tanker con-

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; RED FLAG 85-2

figured which did not allow for one pallet of chase crew maintenance gear. The chase crew had to find sufficient cruise boxes to break down the pack-up into small boxes to be placed around the aircraft. Also the pack-up was restricted to 3,300 pounds which was unsatisfactory to chase a full squadron deployment.

Recommendation: All chase crew C-130's be cargo aircraft which would allow for enough maintenance crews plus gear.

c. Item: Supply Pack-Up for Deployment

Discussion: Limited radar clamp items during the deployment had an adverse effect on radar availability and aircrew training. The supply pack-up was inadequate for a full squadron deployment even with IMA Maintenance support. LRU deficiencies in the pack-up caused aircrews to occasionally fly PMC aircraft.

Recommendation: Ensure adequate quantities of radar clamp items are included in the supply pack-up. Aircraft with operational AMCS is essential for this type of deployment.

d. Item: GSE Support for the Deployment

Discussion: Inadequate numbers of ground electrical units caused delays in turn-around times for the avionics systems of squadron aircraft. Two NC-10's and two Air Force units were inadequate for the workload experienced while on deployment.

Recommendation: Ensure adequate numbers of RFI GSE equipment are supplied to the deploying squadron.


D. L. BOYLE



File

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120/3

S-3

12 Mar 1985

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; ANTI-AIR WARFARE EXERCISE (AAWEX) 3-85

Ref: (a) MAG-31 Letter of Instruction (LOI) 3000 over S-3 of 20 Feb 1985

1. In accordance with the reference, the following is submitted:

PART I - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS. AAWEX 3-85 provided VMFA-251 with valuable and realistic training. Several new pilots in the squadron were exposed to the Marine Corps Command and Control System and to KC-130 air refueling and as such gained a great deal of experience.

PART II - SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES. AAWEX 3-85 required VMFA-251 to provide Air Defense CAP aircraft as tasked by the Tactical Air Commander (TAC) and to conduct air refueling in support of the CAP management.

PART III - STATISTICAL DATA

1. The following data applies to the subject exercise:

a. Date of Exercise: 27 Feb - 1 Mar 1985

b. Total Missions Flown: 12

c. Total Sorties Flown: 24

d. Total Hours Flown: 45.8

e. Total Ordnance Expended:

(1) 14 Simulated AIM-7F

(2) 36 Simulated AIM-9L

f. Total Fuel Utilized:

(1) 45,601 Gallons Local

(2) 28,540 Gallons Airborne

(3) 74,141 Gallons Total

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; ANTI-AIR WARFARE EXERCISE (AAWEX) 3-85

PART IV - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED. This unit experienced no problem areas;
lessons learned during the exercise.


D. L. BOYLE



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MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120/3

S-3

20 Mar 1985

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533 (Attn: SC-103)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)
Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT: VMFA 251 TACTS/DDS DEPLOYMENT, MCAS CHERRY POINT, N.C., 1-10 MARCH 1985
Ref: (a) WgO 3502.1
(b) GruO 3628.2

1. The following constitutes an after action report for the subject deployment in accordance with the reference:

PART I - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS. Training accomplished on the MCAS Cherry Point Display Debriefing System (DDS) was extremely valuable air-to-air training. This detachment made full use of available DDS facility time to expose new aircrews to the dissimilar air threat and to utilize the remaining available sorties to enhance MACS-6 expertise. Primary emphasis however, was placed on the 1V1, 2V1, and 2V2 dissimilar environment, which resulted in several new aircrews becoming ACM qualified.

PART II - DEPLOYMENT STATISTICAL DATA:

1. The following data applies to subject exercise:

- a. MCAS Cherry Point, N.C.
- b. 2-9 March 1985.
- c. 6 F-4S
- d. 16 Officers/3 SNCO's/26 enlisted.
- e. Training objectives achieved:

(1) Three new aircrewmembers ACM qualified for an average CEP increase of 3.0%.

(2) One aircrewman completed MOS training.

(3) One aircrewman ACT(I) Workup.

(4) Average overall CEP increase was 1.9%.

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, VMFA 251 TACTS/DEPLOYMENT, MCAS
CHERRY POINT, N.C. 1-10 MARCH 1985

(5) ECM training accomplished for selected crew members
yielding CEP increase of .4% per aircrewman.

f. Flight hours flown:

(1) Total	120.1 hours
(2) Deployment	83.9 hours
(3) Retrograde	36.2 hours

g. Sorties flown:

(1) Total	89
(2) Deployment	61
(a) Air-to-Air	44
(b) Other	17
(3) Retrograde	28

h. Ordnance: None

i. Area utilized: W-72, W122

PART III PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED WITH COMMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

1. Personnel: None.

2. Intelligence: None.

3. Operations:

(a) Item: Lack of Range Time on DDS

Discussion: An inadequate number of TACTS range periods
were obtained for use on the DDS. VMFA-251 was 16 sorties short
of requested TACTS range periods needed to achieve training
goals.

Recommendation: 2d MAW G-3 should coordinate with
COMFLT WING-1 so that MAG-31 units are not tasked to support DDS
while NAS Oceana is having a FFARP or missile exercise.

4. Supply: None.

5. Embarkation: None.

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, VMFA 251 TACTS/AS DEPLOYMENT, MCAS
CHERRY POINT, N.C. 1-10 MARCH 1985

6. Maintenance:

(a) Item: Inadequate Working Area

Discussion: While deployed to MCAS Cherry Point, squadron maintenance personnel were required to maintain their shops on the open hangar deck of H&MS which posed serious problems. Tool control was very difficult because maintenance personnel were working directly from embark boxes, allowing tools to be easily misplaced. Security of equipment was also a problem at night due to lack of personnel available for night crew.

Morning temperatures were near freezing and the heaters in the hangar did not function. There were no spaces available for maintenance personnel to get warm when they came in from working on aircraft.

Recommendation: Second Marine Aircraft Wing G-3 supply a more suitable working area for MAG-31 units when deployed to MCAS Cherry Point for DDS/MACS-6 support.


(b) Item: Inadequate Billeting for Enlisted Personnel

Discussion: Eight troops per room were placed in the JRC building with space and wall lockers for seven per room. This is not adequate. This provides very limited living space per room for the eight individuals and a definite lack of proper security for personal gear.

Recommendation: Provide adequate billeting for maintenance personnel and the security of personnel gear.

7. Ordnance: None

8. Facilities: See Part III, Par 6(a).


D. L. DOYLE



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

20 MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120

S-3

2 Jul 1985

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; FLEET FIGHTER ACM READINESS PROGRAM (FFARP) 17
MAY-7 JUN 1985

Ref: (a) MAG-31 LOI 3120 over S-3 of 26 Apr 1985

1. In accordance with the reference, the subject report is submitted.

PART I - COMMANDERS COMMENTS

1. FFARP continues to be a must deployment for a fighter squadron. The professional instructors coupled with the different types of bogies and the building block approach of the syllabus cannot be equalled anywhere else.

2. The only unique problem experienced during this deployment was the billeting of SSgt's and below at NOB Norfolk. This billeting situation required the busing of our Marines and added another 1 1/2 hours to their work day. In the future, I would strongly recommend using billeting at Camp Pendleton.

PART II - STATISTICAL DATA

1. The following data applies to subject deployment:

- a. Deployment Site: NAS Oceana, Virginia
- b. Dates: 17 May-7 June 1985
- c. Number of Aircraft: 12 F-4S
- d. Number of Personnel: 33 Officers/28 SNCO's/99 Enlisted
- e. Training Objectives: Average CRP increase was 1.2 for pilots and 1.3 for RIO's.
- f. Flight Hours:
 - (1) Total: 192.7
 - (2) Syllabus: 137.6
 - (3) Ferry/Test: 48.7
 - (4) Day: 186.3
 - (5) Night: 6.4

- (6) Actual Instrument: 17.0
- g. Sorties:
 - (1) Total: 186
 - (2) Syllabus: 139
 - (3) Ferry/Test: 43
 - (4) Night: 4
- h. Ordnance Expended: 197 LW-58 Flares
- i. Ranges Utilized: W-72A (TACTS Range)

PART III - PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED

a. Personnel/Administration

(1) Item: Payday

Discussion: Payday occurred during the second week of the deployment. Checks were delivered to the squadron by express mail which was sent the day prior to payday. They arrived at noon on the payday and were delivered to all concerned shortly thereafter. Two Training Management Element's (TME) and two Marines from Det B did not receive checks. Prior to deploying, Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) and TME had been contacted and instructed to deliver a list of deployed Marines who wanted checks sent to Oceana to disbursing. H&MS complied and their checks arrived on time but TME mailed their own using regular mail. Those checks never arrived at Oceana and are still unaccounted for. The two Marines from Det B were added late to the deployment and proper liaison was not made prior to deploying. Their checks were sent up the following day on a C-12 from Beaufort.

Recommendation: Three days prior to payday, S-1 should check the pay status for all deployed Marines not on direct deposit, talk with the S-1 section for each attached Marine and insure that disbursing will deliver that Marines check with those for the rest of the squadron.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations

(1) Item: VF-43

Discussion: The highest praise is passed to VF-43 for their professional and flexible attitude towards scheduling. The training accomplished by the aircrews of VMFA-251 was of the highest quality available.

Recommendations: None.

(2) Item: Syllabus Completion

Discussion: The FFARP syllabus requires all aircrews to fly 11 sorties. Due to inclement weather 2 1/2 flying days were lost which resulted in all of VMFA-251's 16 crews completing 9 of the scheduled 11 sorties. Also, 1 day was lost due to a public holiday. Even with 3 1/2 flying days being lost, a high percentage of the FFARP syllabus was completed.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the duration of a FFARP deployment remains at 3 weeks. Obviously this period should be increased if a MCCRES is to be incorporated.

(3) Item: GCI Controllers

Discussion: The Squadron was assigned 3 GCI controllers from MACS-5 for the duration of the deployment. Unfortunately, Exercise Solid Shield 85 denied this unit the opportunity to work with the assigned controllers prior to the deployment. Their capability and support was beneficial to the success achieved by this squadron during the deployment despite this shortfall.

Recommendation: That GCI controllers continue to be utilized by squadrons during all ACM deployments and that the assigned controllers be part of the pre-deployment work-up where possible.

d. Logistics

(1) Item: Pre-deployment points of contact

Discussion: There was a great problem in initially establishing who the points of contact should be in order to co-ordinate all the problems we were facing on this deployment. As Group has squadrons going to FFARP all the time an information packet on who to contact for liaison should be available (ie COMFITWING ONE). COMFITWING ONE did not appreciate our individual efforts in finding billeting, transportation and messing. And once they were involved in the problems they did not provide any real solutions. If they had been identified earlier they may have been able to provide better help. In direct relation to this is the subject of a host squadron. The host squadron, VF-11, was not identified until within one week of our deployment. As Marine units are not tenant units at NAS Oceana the host squadron needs to be identified by COMFITWING ONE in sufficient time for timely liaison.

Recommendation: That MAG-31 address the problem of a contact folder for future deployments to NAS Oceana.

(2) Item: Enlisted Billeting

Discussion: The distance to, location and condition of the enlisted Marines' accommodation was unsatisfactory. All E-6's and below were accommodated at Enterprise Hall, NOB Norfolk, which was listed as a sub-standard quarters for navy personnel. The bus journey to and from NOB Norfolk added 1 1/2 hours to each working day.

Recommendation: That billeting on NAS Oceana must be available prior to accepting FFARP dates.

(3) Item: MAG-31 S-4 Support

Discussion: MAG-31 S-4 provided great assistance in resolving some of this unit's problems, in particular with the bus contract and assistance with the rental vehicles.

Recommendation: None.

e. Safety. None.

f. Maintenance

(1) Item: H&MS-31 Maintenance Support

Discussion: H&MS-31 AIMD section provided good turnaround time on equipment and gave technical assistance when needed.

Recommendation: Commend H&MS-31 Support personnel for their hard work and assistance during the deployment.

(2) Item: Supply Pack-Up

Discussion: Limited numbers of selected radar clamp items, such as no LRU-1's. 2 A5's and 2 A1's had a major impact on aircraft availability during the deployment. The small supply pack-up for radar parts caused most of these items to be ex-rep which accounted for most of the aircraft down time for the squadron.

Recommendation: There should be an increase in the number of radar clamp items for deployments where radar's play a major role. At least one of all the major LRU's should be carried in the pack-up.

(3) Item: Electrical Power Unit

Discussion: H&MS-31 GSE provided two NC-10's for the FFARP deployment which proved to be inadequate. Maintenance time was lost due to work centers waiting for either of the two NC-10's that were almost always in use. NAS Oceana was unable to provide this squadron with electrical power units.

Recommendation: MAG-31 GSE should provide sufficient power units to meet a twelve plane squadron deployment. This especially is necessary in a high tempo operation such as a FFARP.

(4) Item: Pallet Covers

Discussion: During the embark phase from MCAS Beaufort to NAS Oceana; a number of pallets were not covered. Due to inclement weather on arrival, parts of the squadron's pack-up were rained on.

Recommendation: Pallet covers should be provided to waterproof all of the squadron's pack-up.

(5) Item: Vehicles

3120
2 Jul 1985

Discussion: This squadron had only two station vehicles assigned, both of which were in below average condition. After three days into the deployment both vehicles were inoperative due to mechanical problems. One of the vehicles was able to be repaired but not the other. This left both Maintenance and Supply with only one vehicle, which impacted aircraft availability. Station Motor Transport has several new vehicles but only tenant units could check out these vehicles.

Recommendation: With Maintenance needing at least one vehicle present at any given time, it is obvious that two vehicles should be assigned to the Maintenance Department. Also with Supply requiring at least one vehicle, a total of three working vehicles would be needed to support a joint Supply and Maintenance effort. All of these vehicles should be in good condition and replaced, if needed, immediately.


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